The COVID-19 Crash of 2020

The stock market crash of March 2020 was the fastest bear market in history. The S&P 500 fell 34% in just 23 trading days, from its all-time high of 3,386 on February 19 to its low of 2,237 on March 23. The decline erased approximately $10 trillion in market capitalization from U.S. equities alone. Global stock markets fell in unison. Oil prices collapsed, briefly turning negative for the first time in history. Corporate bond markets froze. Even U.S. Treasury bonds, the traditional safe haven during equity declines, experienced a period of intense selling as investors liquidated everything in a scramble for cash.

The recovery was equally unprecedented. The S&P 500 regained its February high by August 18, just five months after the bottom. By the end of 2020, the index was up 16% for the year. By the end of 2021, it had gained 27% more. The fastest crash in history was followed by the fastest recovery, producing one of the most compressed and dramatic boom-bust-boom cycles in market history.

The Trigger

Unlike every other crisis discussed in this series, the COVID crash was triggered by an event entirely outside the financial system. There was no preceding credit boom, no housing bubble, no excessive financial leverage in the banking sector. The trigger was a virus.

COVID-19 was first identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019. Through January and February 2020, the outbreak spread to South Korea, Iran, and Italy. Markets initially treated the outbreak as a regional event with limited global implications. The S&P 500 hit its all-time high on February 19, even as the virus was already spreading in multiple countries.

The perception shifted rapidly in late February. Italy reported a surge in cases and implemented quarantine measures on February 21. Cases were reported in dozens of countries. On February 24, the Monday after the Italian outbreak was reported, the S&P 500 fell 3.4%. The selling accelerated over the following days. By February 28, the index had fallen 12.8% from its peak, the fastest correction (10%+ decline) from an all-time high in history.

In March, the crisis intensified. The World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic on March 11. The United States banned travel from Europe on March 12, the same day the S&P 500 fell 9.5%, its worst day since the 1987 crash. NBA, NHL, and MLB seasons were suspended. Schools closed. Businesses shut. Within days, it became clear that the response to the virus would involve shutting down large portions of the global economy for an unknown duration.

The Market Dynamics

The March 2020 crash differed from previous crises in several respects.

Speed. The decline from all-time high to bear market (a 20%+ decline) took just 16 trading days, shattering the previous record of 38 trading days set in 1929. The speed reflected the nature of the shock: a sudden, exogenous event with no historical precedent that invalidated virtually all economic forecasts simultaneously.

Universality of selling. In most crises, some asset classes serve as hedges. Bonds typically rise when stocks fall. Gold often appreciates during periods of uncertainty. In March 2020, virtually everything was sold. U.S. Treasuries, corporate bonds, municipal bonds, gold, and equities all experienced selling pressure simultaneously during the week of March 9-13. The indiscriminate selling reflected a "dash for cash" driven by uncertainty so extreme that investors wanted nothing except the most liquid, risk-free asset: dollar cash.

Lack of preceding financial excess. The 2008 crisis was preceded by years of housing speculation and financial leverage. The dot-com crash was preceded by years of equity speculation. The COVID crash hit a financial system that was, by most measures, in sound condition. Bank capital ratios were roughly double their pre-2008 levels. Household leverage was lower. The crisis was not caused by financial fragility but by an external shock that temporarily shut down economic activity.

Volatility. The VIX, the market's implied volatility index, reached 82.69 on March 16, surpassing its peak during the 2008 crisis. The S&P 500 experienced moves of 5% or more on eight separate trading days in March 2020. The market was effectively untradeable for many participants; the gap between bid and ask prices widened to levels that made execution uncertain and costly.

The Oil Crash

Alongside the equity market decline, oil prices collapsed. Demand destruction from the pandemic, combined with a price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia (Saudi Arabia dramatically increased production on March 8 after OPEC+ talks broke down), pushed oil prices from approximately $55 per barrel in January to under $20 by late March.

On April 20, 2020, the May futures contract for West Texas Intermediate crude oil traded at negative $37.63 per barrel. This was the first time in history that oil had traded at a negative price. The negative price reflected a storage crisis: with demand collapsing and storage facilities full, traders who held the expiring futures contract faced the prospect of having to take physical delivery of oil with nowhere to put it. They paid others to take the contracts off their hands.

The Policy Response

The speed and scale of the policy response to the COVID crash was without historical precedent.

The Federal Reserve. The Fed cut the federal funds rate to zero in two emergency meetings on March 3 and March 15. It restarted quantitative easing, initially at $700 billion and then expanding to unlimited purchases. It created a series of emergency lending facilities including the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility. Most dramatically, it created the Primary and Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facilities, which for the first time in the Fed's history allowed it to purchase corporate bonds and corporate bond ETFs. The Fed's balance sheet expanded from $4.2 trillion to $7.2 trillion within months.

Congress. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, signed on March 27, provided approximately $2.2 trillion in fiscal support, the largest economic rescue package in U.S. history. It included direct payments to individuals ($1,200 per adult), enhanced unemployment benefits ($600 per week supplement), the Paycheck Protection Program ($349 billion in forgivable loans to small businesses, later expanded), and aid to corporations, state and local governments, and hospitals.

Additional fiscal packages followed. Total U.S. fiscal support related to COVID eventually exceeded $5 trillion across multiple bills passed in 2020 and 2021.

Global coordination. Central banks around the world cut rates and expanded asset purchases. The European Central Bank launched a 750 billion euro Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme. The Bank of Japan expanded its asset purchases. Governments worldwide implemented fiscal stimulus programs. The coordinated global response was faster and larger than the response to any previous crisis.

The Recovery

The market bottomed on March 23, 2020. The recovery that followed was the fastest from a bear market low in history.

Several factors drove the rapid rebound. The unprecedented policy response, particularly the Fed's willingness to backstop virtually every credit market, eliminated the risk of a financial system collapse. Unlike 2008, where the crisis originated within the financial system and required months to diagnose and address, the COVID shock was external, and the policy response could be deployed immediately because the transmission mechanism was clear: provide income replacement to offset the economic shutdown.

The nature of the crisis also supported recovery. A pandemic, unlike a banking crisis, does not destroy productive capacity. The factories, technology, intellectual property, and workforce that existed before the pandemic still existed during it. The economic shutdown was, in principle, temporary. Once the virus was controlled (through vaccines, treatments, or behavioral adaptation), economic activity could resume.

The technology sector, which comprised a large share of the S&P 500, actually benefited from the pandemic. Remote work boosted demand for cloud computing, video conferencing, e-commerce, and digital entertainment. Companies like Amazon, Microsoft, Apple, Zoom, and Netflix saw their businesses accelerate. The Nasdaq Composite reached a new all-time high by June 2020, just three months after the crash.

The Aftermath: Inflation and Consequences

The massive fiscal and monetary stimulus that rescued the economy from the pandemic shutdown had consequences that took time to manifest.

The combination of trillions in government spending, near-zero interest rates, and supply chain disruptions caused by the pandemic produced the highest inflation in 40 years. The Consumer Price Index reached 9.1% year-over-year in June 2022. The Federal Reserve responded by raising interest rates from near zero to over 5% between March 2022 and July 2023, the most aggressive tightening cycle since the early 1980s.

The rate increases caused significant market stress. The S&P 500 fell 25% from its January 2022 peak to its October 2022 trough. The bond market experienced its worst year on record in 2022. The cryptocurrency market lost roughly 75% of its value. Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, and First Republic Bank all failed in early 2023, victims of rising rates that depressed the value of their bond portfolios.

The debate over whether the scale of the 2020 stimulus was excessive, and whether the subsequent inflation was a predictable consequence of printing and distributing too much money, will continue for years. The counterargument is that the alternative, allowing a deflationary spiral and mass unemployment during a pandemic, would have been far worse.

Lessons for Investors

The COVID crash offers several distinct lessons.

Exogenous shocks can be as severe as financial crises. The COVID crash demonstrated that the most dangerous risks are not always the ones that build gradually within the financial system. An event outside of finance, a pandemic, a war, a natural disaster, can produce losses as severe as any credit crisis.

The fastest declines often produce the fastest recoveries. Crashes caused by exogenous shocks, where the financial system is fundamentally sound, tend to recover more quickly than crashes caused by systemic financial problems. The 2020 crash lasted 33 days. The 2008 crash lasted 17 months. The key variable is whether the productive capacity of the economy has been damaged.

Policy response speed matters. The Fed and Congress acted in weeks rather than months. The speed prevented the negative feedback loops, credit contraction, cascading defaults, and bank failures, that had amplified every previous crisis. Investors should pay close attention to the speed and scale of policy responses, as they are often the single best predictor of how severe and prolonged a downturn will be.

Selling during a panic is extraordinarily costly. An investor who sold the S&P 500 on March 23, 2020, locked in a 34% loss. Five months later, the market had fully recovered. Twelve months later, the market was up 75% from the low. The cost of panic selling during the fastest bear market in history was among the highest of any crisis, precisely because the recovery was so swift that there was no opportunity to "buy back in at a lower price."

Unprecedented does not mean permanent. The word "unprecedented" was used more frequently during the COVID crisis than during any previous market event. Every aspect of the crisis, the speed of the decline, the nature of the trigger, the scale of the policy response, was without precedent. And yet the outcome, a sharp decline followed by a recovery to new highs, was entirely consistent with the historical pattern. Unprecedented circumstances do not require unprecedented investment responses. The same principles, diversification, adequate liquidity, long-term perspective, and resistance to panic, that have served investors through every previous crisis served them through this one as well.

Nazli Hangeldiyeva
Written by
Nazli Hangeldiyeva

Co-Founder of Grid Oasis. Political Science & International Relations, Istanbul Medipol University.

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